India and Pakistan go nuclear

At 3.45 p.m. local time on 11 May 1998, Indian scientists conducted three nuclear test explosions, violating a global norm that had been observed since July 1996, when China conducted its last nuclear test. The tests culminated more than two decades of research and more than two years of secretive preparations and scientists' pleas for authorization from the government. The tests were finally made possible by the formation of a government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Indian People's Party), which had made 'exercising the nuclear option' one of its campaign themes. The first three Indian test explosions were followed by two more on 13 May and six Pakistani test explosions two weeks later. . . .

The [BJP-led government] was willing to authorize the tests that the nuclear establishment had been hoping to carry out since late 1995. The Indian tests created an opportunity for Pakistani scientists to gain authorization for their own tests. Despite the apparent personal reluctance of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the public and media outcry for tests and the military's growing fascination with nuclear deterrence as a means to compensate for inferiority in conventional weapons made it unlikely that Pakistan would not leap through the window of opportunity opened by India.

Although the tests came almost eight years after both countries apparently achieved the ability to deliver nuclear bombs by aircraft, they are nonetheless significant in their own right and will have a variety of implications. Militarily, the main effect of the tests was that on military technology transfer from the USA to India, which was immediately cut off. As a result, the foreign dependence of India's 'indigenous' military research and development (R&D) programmes has been revealed. These programmes will have to be restructured or abandoned, leaving India more dependent on other arms suppliers.

No clear decision to expand their nuclear capabilities has yet been made by either government. There are encouraging signs that India will limit the size of its arsenal and may not change the nature of its deployment immediately. With a policy of not using nuclear weapons first, India seeks mainly to deter Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and preserve an option to respond appropriately if relations with China deteriorate. The situation in Pakistan is less clear, but the indications are that the military continues to exaggerate the value of nuclear deterrence and may move more decisively towards deployments of a provocative sort. The threat to use nuclear weapons first is central to Pakistani strategic thinking and has long been associated in military planners' minds with deterring a conventional military response to provocations in Kashmir short of war, for example, incitement and material support to local insurgents and infiltration of Mujahideen (guerrilla fighters) trained elsewhere.

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