Conflict in Yugoslavia: after the fall of Srebrenica, a UN peacekeeping mission is replaced by a NATO force

During the Bosnian Serb attack on the safe area of Srebrenica in July the commander of the Dutch UNPROFOR troops stationed there made repeated pleas for air support but was turned down either by UNPROFOR in Sarajevo or by UN Peace Forces commander Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier until it was too late. On 11 July Janvier and the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, finally approved an attack but limited it to tanks in the safe area and artillery seen fi ring. NATO jets attacked two tanks and withdrew. Srebrenica and Zepa later both fell to the Bosnian Serbs, precipitating a crisis for the UN operation and strong pressure from NATO to move towards overt and robust peace enforcement. . . .

The force that replaced UNPROFOR after the NATO bombings, IFOR, was also authorized by the Security Council to use force under Chapter VII but acquired stronger rules of engagement and much greater capability to use deadly force than any UN force had ever been given. Ironically, however, IFOR's role was more akin to traditional peacekeeping than UNPROFOR's since it was to help implement a peace agreement, including separation of forces, patrolling established zones between them and responding to cease-fire and other violations.

NATO forces on patrol in Yugoslavia: IFOR replaced UNPROFOR and acquired stronger rules of engagement and the authority to use greater force than any previous UN force

Several lessons have been painfully learned from the UN's involvement with the use of force in Bosnia. One is that the 'sub-contracting' out of peace enforcement is problematic because, in seeking to marry the differing perceptions, goals and methods of very different organizations, it complicates and weakens the chain of command. Second, an attempt to disguise peace enforcement as the use of force in self-defence (in order to avoid the escalatory implications of the former and retain support of troop contributors) will not fool the parties on the ground and will not deter them from reacting to the perceived abandonment of UN impartiality. A third lesson is a reinforcement of one supposedly learned in the Congo in the 1960s and in Somalia in 1993: that peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the same geographical space are incompatible unless peacekeepers are withdrawn to safety and peacekeeping at least temporarily abandoned, and that one type of operation should not be allowed to drift into the other. Finally, peacekeepers should not be mandated to use robust force, even in self-defence, unless they have the proper political support, military capability and other resources. The overall lesson of the UNPROFOR experience can be sloganized as: 'no peacekeeping without a peace to keep'.

Experience in the former Yugoslavia will profoundly affect UN views on its future involvement in peace enforcement. This was already apparent in late 1995 in the reluctance of Boutros-Ghali, in the wake of the Dayton accords, to see a UN force deployed to oversee the transfer of Eastern Slavonia from Serb to Croat control, particularly without the protection of a Chapter VII mandate. None the less the exigencies of particular crises may force the UN to become involved in less than optimal circumstances. While opposing a UN force for Eastern Slavonia, Boutros-Ghali was at the same time advocating an intervention force for Burundi despite the uncertainties involved in such a mission.

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