NABIL ELARABY

When I was contacted to be asked whether I would be available to join SIPRI's Governing Board, I enthusiastically agreed. I was aware of the valuable contributions of SIPRI as I started working in the field of disarmament in the Egyptian Mission to the United Nations in 1966, a date which coincided with the founding of SIPRI.

My assignment was to follow the final stages of the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At that time delegations were striving to finalize the treaty and were in constant need of objective data on a global scale on disarmament issues. They also needed analysis of relevant technological developments. Chanceries throughout the world and in particular in the developing countries did not possess, in that pre-Internet period, the capacity to undertake this task efficiently and independently. There was a clear need for a reliable publication of high repute which could be considered as the textbook for references and could provide delegates with an overview of disarmament issues all over the world.

This worldwide demand was realized in 1969, when the first SIPRI Yearbook was published. As is well known, the Yearbook is today considered as the general-purpose work of reference for disarmament issues. SIPRI's publications bring together objective data and state-of-theart analysis which governments can study and rely upon in preparing their positions. In disarmament-related issues, no other publication receives more attention. SIPRI's publications have become required reading.

A few years later, while in the Permanent Mission of Egypt in Geneva, my responsibilities included disarmament. The negotiating body established by the General Assembly was called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, or the CCD. In the mid-1970s the CCD produced an early study on nuclear weapon-free zones. There again, the publications of SIPRI, whose area of expertise had meanwhile expanded beyond nuclear weapons, were extremely useful.

In 1987-91 I was Egypt's Special Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (the name adopted after the 1978 General Assembly's first Special Session on Disarmament), or CD, in Geneva. The focus during that period was on chemical weapons. SIPRI's data, analysis and publications were indispensable in this field. I cannot refer to that period without paying tribute to Rolf Ekéus' valuable contributions: his efforts were crucial in securing the Chemical Weapons Convention.

I personally witnessed, as Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations in New York and Chairman of the First Committee in 1992, how much the UN delegations also depended on SIPRI's analysis and publications. My main responsibility as Chairman was to ensure the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention which the General Assembly adopted in that session.

In the course of my participation in Board meetings I came to appreciate more the Institute's valuable contribution in the areas of peace, security, arms control and disarmament. In my view, the influence and worldwide prestige of SIPRI could be further extended by opening up new areas for research and analysis. One area which I hope SIPRI will consider exploring is the collective security system ushered in by the UN Charter, which was conceived before the advent of the atomic age. The rapid technological developments in weaponry require serious re-thinking. I firmly believe that an examination of the feasibility of upgrading and enhancing the role of the Security Council in disarmament issues is long overdue. Article 26 of the UN Charter conferred an awesome responsibility on the Security Council. It 'shall be responsible for formulating. . . plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments'. I venture to propose that what is now needed is a concerted effort to enhance the role of the Security Council within a coordinated system which would include comprehensive and universal verification.

It boils down to the question of whether the international community is prepared to demonstrate the resolve necessary to meet a nuclear threat through some automatic mechanism

The Security Council should truly become the ultimate authority to ensure compliance and be in a position to defend again military threat or attack, in order to cope with the requirements of our time and to meet the new priorities of the 21st century. To attain this goal a two-track approach is proposed. It would consist of significant institutional and constitutional reforms.

1. The institutional reform should take the form of establishing standing machinery to ascertain and analyse any threat emanating from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. At present, some embryonic ideas are floating in the corridors of the UN. One available option is to establish a standing organ with the responsibility to ensure universal monitoring of compliance with existing disarmament conventions.

2. The constitutional reform, however, is much more difficult to attain. It would involve establishing an edifice of reliability and credibility so that states are assured that the Security Council will react in a timely and decisive manner to threats by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It boils down to the question whether the international community is prepared to demonstrate the resolve necessary to meet a nuclear threat through some automatic mechanism. This would require addressing the unanimity rule in the voting system of the Security Council with a view to ensuring that the veto will not be exercised in the area of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Such threats should be considered beyond the scope of the application of the veto.

To obtain this objective, a fourth paragraph should be added to Article 27 which could roughly read: 'Decisions of the Security Council on matters relating to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, whenever there is a threat or use of nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction, shall be made by the affirmative vote of nine members'.

No doubt such a proposal represents a formidable challenge. The five permanent members of the Security Council have always been adamant in rejecting all attempts to restrict their freedom of action. The gravity of the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is very real and should serve as a convincing incentive to strive for the creation of a credible collective security regime. As long as the veto can be exercised at will against the adoption of a measure to protect a victim state from the havoc and destruction associated with weapons of mass destruction, the UN collective security system will be considered defective. The Security Council's reactions and measures in the area of WMD should be freed from the fetters of the veto. I am fully aware that such a proposal may be viewed as rather risky at a time when many accusations of double standards are levelled at the Security Council. However, such a proposal entails an amendment to the Charter that will take years to come into operation. Hopefully, the international political climate would be, at that time, more relaxed.

I would like to propose that SIPRI, which in its first 40 years has rendered great and unparalleled service to the cause of peace, security and disarmament, consider now expanding its contribution. New horizons need to be approached: among them, revisiting and enhancing the role of the Security Council. I therefore hope that SIPRI will consider engaging itself in this task in the coming years.