The debate before the USA and the coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003

The picture of Saddam Hussein as a bad ruler and a dangerous man who had repeatedly flouted international opinion and international obligations was largely uncontested in 2002. The USA's insistence that the time had come to stop his wrongdoing by force, however, was consistently supported by only a few countries (notably the UK) and opposed by Iraq's neighbours, China, Russia and many European countries. Their reservations and objections could with some simplification be divided into four categories. First, there were divergent judgements on the scale and immediacy of the danger from Iraqi WMD. Those who placed the threat lowest (although generally with less access to intelligence than the USA and the UK) were disposed to argue that a combination of traditional sanctions, embargoes, inspections and territorial 'containment' would suffice at least to stop matters getting worse. The general argument was also made that few problems of proliferation had ever been, or could be, solved by military means. The USA itself appeared to favour more 'political' approaches to the even clearer danger from North Korea, and for containment of India-Pakistan tensions, not to mention the (usually left unspoken) case of Israel.

A second set of arguments concerned the likely risks and costs of military action, especially if it aimed at or led to complete regime change. It focused on such issues as the possible unleashing of Kurdish and Turcoman separatism (a special worry for Turkey) and revenge by the Shi'a majority; possible humanitarian and refugee calamities; the need for extensive rebuilding by the USA or international authorities, coupled with doubt over whether the intervening forces would be willing to remain in Iraq for as long as necessary afterwards; and fears that the 'domino effect' could be negative rather than positive, destablizing other regional powers and exacerbating anti-Western sentiment. . . .

The third argument was essentially about priorities. It took the form of questioning whether Iraq really deserved precedence over the ongoing direct struggle with international terrorism, the need to stabilize a still fragile Afghanistan and the search for a way to stop new violence on both sides in the Middle East.

The fourth set of arguments was about principles-notably the question of whether a single state, even one as powerful as the USA, could arrogate to itself the right to act unilaterally as judge, jury and executioner against another sovereign entity which had not directly attacked it. The real depth of this concern arose not so much from the circumstances of the Iraq case as from uncertainty over how far and in which directions the USA might intend to press its doctrines of unilateral and/or pre-emptive intervention in the future. Even some who largely shared the Bush Administration's threat analysis argued that a counter-strategy of military coercion, although it might succeed in the short term, would risk both discrediting the liberal-democratic values it was meant to protect and stirring up stronger resentment and resistance to the USA's leadership in the longer run.

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